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1. INTRODUCTION
This report is an Overall Executive Summary of work accom-
plished from i September 1074 through 27 February 1976 on the seve
Advanced Space Program Studies covered by NASA Contract NASW-e 47.
Table 1-1 lists the studies, their funding, and The Aerospace Corp(,ration
MTS deliveries.
Table 1 -1. Advanced Space Program Studies
Study Title funding MTSMan Months
2. 1 Manned Systems Utilization $351,000 57.7
Analysis
2.2 STS Users Study 200,000 31.8
2.3 Vehicle Cost/Performance 100,000 18. 1
Analysis
2.4 Standardization and Program 258,700 39.5
Effect Analysis
2. 5 Study of the Commonality of 425, 000 5815
Space Vehicle .Applications to
Future National Neede
2. 6 STS Spin Stabilized Upper Stage 150,000 25. 7
(SSUS) Study
Z. 7 Technology Assessment and 21,000 3.3
Forecast
The objectives of these studies were to provide NASA with multi-
disciplined advanced planning studies that involved space operations and
the associated system elements (including man), identification of potential
low cost system techniques, vehicle design, cost synthesis techniques,
DoD technology forecasting, and the development of near- and far-term
space initiatives with emphasis on domestic and military use commonality.
All of the studies involved consideration of both NASA and DoD require-
ments and planning data. Studies 2.1 through 2.5 were covered in the
1-1
'.
Statement of Work. Studies 2. 6 and 2. 7 were added to the contract in
February and June 1975, respectively.
The Advanced Space Program Studies performed by The Aerospace
Corporation since FY 1970 have been for the NASA Office of Manned Space
Flight. The support base, however, was broadened in FY 1975 to include
the Low Cost Sys , ezns Office (Study 2.4) and the Office of Aeronautics and
Space Technology (Study 2.7).
Every attempt was made to integrate the studies, where feasible,
and in particular to utilize the data from individual studies to the extent
possible in the other studies. An example is Study 2. 3 - "Vehicle Cost/
Performance Analysis" and Study 2.4 - "Standardization and Program
Effects Analysis. " The computerized technique developed in Study 2. 3,
which allowed the design and cost synthesis of an unmanned payload based
upon mission requirements, was used to configure and cost the "New Starts"
in Study 2. 4 and provide quantification for the use of standarized hardware,
A key effort that has received vast exposure was Study 2. 5 - "The
Study of the Commonality of Space Vehicle Application to Future National
Needs. " This effort identified more than 100 new and highly innovative
space systems for the 1980 - 2000 time period that offer promising utility
and commonality to both the domestic and military sectors.
An effort that was initiated approximately midway into FY 1975
was Study 2. 6 - "Spin Stabilized Upper Stage" (SSUS). This effort was
directed at investigating the utility of spinning solid upper stages deployed
from the orbiter to perform a variety of upper stage NASA payload missions.
This approach was found to be very attractive for Delta (up to 1000 lb on
orbit) and Atlas Centaur (up to 2100 lb on orbit) class payloads.
In all studies, the unique ability of The Aerospace Corporation to
focus on DoD planning and incorporate these data in the NASA studies was
exercised,
,.ate
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Z. MANNED SYSTEMS UTILIZATION ANALYSIS
(STUDY 2, 1)
The Skylab/.ATM (Apollo Telescope Mount) experience has shown
that active manned support, at least for complex scientific instruments,
is vital to the achievement of mission objectives. Many of the ATM instru-
ments would have faller, far short of their scientific objectives had this
direct form of support not been available. Manned maintenance, therefore,
with proper spares provisioning and a few basic tools, is seen as a unique
element in the planning for future space operations.
The objective of this effort was to relate this capability for sus-
taining scientific instruments in orbit to alternate measures for achieving
comparable system availab3lity. This was achieved two ways, First, by
comparing historical evidence of similar scientific instruments relative to
anomalous occurrence and the subsequent actions taken to sustain opera-
tions. Second, a comparison of manned maintenance versus redundancy
of design was made for the Skylab S-056 X-ray telescope to achieve
comparible availabilities. This provided a foundation for extrapolating to
future space operations relative to the preferred mode of operation. The
results of this effort are summarized in the following sections,
2.1	 APPROACH
The foundation for the research into anomalous occurrences was
developed by examining the historical results of three similar experiments
programs. These were the OV1 series of automated spacecraft developed
by the USAF, SAMSO organization; the OSO-7 automated spacecraft devel-
oped by NASA, OSFC; and the Skylab 5-056 X-ray telescope experiment in
the ATM, as shown in Figure 2-1. Each program was similar in its
objectives and represented increasing levels of complexity to accomplish
the mission objectives -- the gathering of X-ray spectral data. Each pro-
2-1
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grain had unique failure modes and in each case, to some degree, fell
short of accomplishing the total mission objectives,
A second effort addressed special features in terms of weight,
volume, and reliability associated with designing for space maintenance.
This was achieved by reconfiguring the 5-056 X-ray telescope for mainte-
nance and using these data to extrapolate to other ATM experiments. The
estimated reliability characteristics were then examined to determine the
oenefits of repair operations, as well as when redundancy should be
employed to achieve comparable availabilities on orbit.
Z. a	 MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENT
Several empirical factors were developed to express the value of
maintenance action, either through remote command or by direct action on
the part of a crew man. These factors provided a relative measure to the
value improvement by repair action as a function of .ha complexity of the
instrument involved. Historical data formed the basis of this assessment
process. As an example, the OV1 had a telemetry interference problem,
the OSO-7 was oriented incorrectly and the 5-056 had high friction loads
in the film drive mechanism.
The results of this effort indicated that without corrective action
either by remote command or in the case of the 5-056, by direct manned
contact, the instruments would have failed early in their operational
periods. Further, as the complexity of the design increased, the need for
direct maintenance (by a flight crew member) substantially increased, As
evidenced with the 5-056 X-ray telescope, (as well as all the ATM experi-
ments) numerous repair actions were required during the course of the
mission. All of this occurred in spite of the fact that extensive ground
testing was performed before the equipment was committed to orbit.
2-3
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The conclusions drawn, therefore, were;
1.	 Scientifi4 instruments exhibit a trend toward increased
complexity ;ind cost to fulfill expanding objectives.
L.	 Scientific inotruxnents, in general, incorporate vary
litt.e redundancy and, in fact, because of the uniqueness
of the instruments' redundancy, seldom provide a viable
option (optics, beam splitters, etc. ).
a,	 In the future, direct manned maintenance can offer an
effective means for achieving a high instrument availability
for complex scientific experiments operating for exten-
sive periods of time.
4	 The additional weight, volume, and cost impact associate. i
with initially designing for . panned interaction is minimal
for instruments of this type relative to the improved opera-
tional potential.
Further evidence of the advantage of this design approach is shown
-	 in figure 2-2. This figure provides a comparison of the wei ght itnpac.t
associated with the achievement of various levels of operational availability
for the S-056 X-ray telescope. In both cases, the results have been opti-
inized to provide the greatest improvement in availability fot the lowest
incremental weight increase. An initial penalty occurs for tie, rcp.iir
option due to provisions for access to all key components of the instrument
(shutter drive motors, filters, etc. ). However, once this has been accom-
plished, and spare components made available, it is seen that a 5ub:,tcintial
improvement in availability can be achieved with little additional penalty.
This occurs because the components themselves are relatively small and
interchangeable (motors, power supplies).
Although these characteristics may vary with other scientific
instrurr. ents, the trend shown should be applicable to a wide range of optical
sensors. A relatively high availability over a long operational period is
desired. The potential to achieve this availability through the use of redun-
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dancy has a practical limit that may preclude achieving the mission goals.
in practice, a combination of both concepts should be employed; utilize
redundancy where it can be employed effectively, but do not preclude
manned maintenance of all critical areas of importance,
The S-056 X-ray telescope had numerous single-point failures
that could have substantially reduced the mission effectiveness had they
occurred, however, the anomalies that occurred would not normally be
exposed by any reliability analysis anyway.
Hence, it is concluded that the success of the mission was due
principally to the fact that man was available for maintenance of those
unpredictable anomalies that inherently occur in any complex system. Man
was that unique element which prc, ided the flexibility of action to sustain
a system that otherwise would have terminated within the first few weeks
of operation.
This lesson should not go unheeded as plans for future missions
evolve. Complex scientific instruments, whether free-flyers or Spa_celab
pay-Dads should not preclude manned interaction as the most effective
means of achieving high system availabilities.
26
4
L
4
3, STS USERS STUDY
(STUDY 2. 2)
The STS User Study included:
a. The STS User Plan (User Data Requirements) Study
b. The Ancillary Equipment Study,
The objective of the STS User Data Requirements Study was to
identify STS user required data not being furnished and describe them. In
addition, the NASA STS User Handbook effort was se.pported by this STS
User Plan Study.
In order to define and develop Multi-Mission Support Equipment
(MMSE) for the STS, NASA needed to understand which support equipments
under consideration were potentially useful for DoD STS payloads. This
could result in a cost savings for both agencies. In Part 2 of the STS User
Study, the ancillary equipment needs for DoD payloads were examined. It
appeared that many of the NASA MMSE corresponded to the types of equip-
rnent needed by DoD and thus considerable savings were possible. Fifteen
on-line MME were potentially applicable to one or more of the DoD pay
loads in the near term.
3. 1	 STS USER PLAN (USER DATA REQUIREMENTS) STUDY
3, 1.1	 Objectives
The objectives of the STS User Plan (User Data Requirements)
Study were to:
a. Prepare an overall estimate of data and planning require-
ments needed by the STS uaer
b. Determine where the NASA and USAF studies related to
STS users fit into the estimated Matrix of planning require-
ments
3-1
C .	 Provide NASA with the contractors' estimates of additional
user required data not currently covered by study activity
which, if carried out, would satisfy the requirements.
3.1.2	 Approach
On the basis of the information on NASA and DoD payload pro-
jects, a list of STS user data requirements were made. The requirements
included data shown to be needed for past or current payload projects. The
data requirements were identified with the project phase for which each
was required. STS payload study data were also used to determine payload
data requirements. In addition, user data requirements which might not
be evident from the documentation were generated 'uy payload specialists.
The user data requirements list was related through a matrix
format to a typical payload project activity by program phase. The full
matrix listing the user data requirements is 39 pages and is presented in
the STS Users Study (Study 2. 2) Final Report, Volume II: STS User Plan
(User Data Requirements) Study, Aerospace Report No. ATR-76(7362)-1,
dated 1 November 1975. A condensed example is shown In Table 3-1. The
data requirements are listed in the lefthand column and payload program
phases are listed across the top of the page. Pre-Phase A and Phase A are
conceptual study phases; while Phase B is a system definition phase.
Phases C and D are the Design and Development Phases. These phases
represent typical steps which a user's payload project may go through.
Where (D appears in a column, the data are required in order to carry
out a normal study in that phase of payload activity. Where a ® appears,
it denotes that it is desirable to have the inforn, ''on or data available for
that phase of the study, but the study could normally be carried out using
assumed or estimated data. The numbers in the matrix (uncircled) are
the number of documents reviewed which contain data pertinent to the area.
3-2
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77-79
The completed User Data Requirements Matrix was inspected to
determine where data were missing or inadequate. In 'fable 3-1 the nota-
tion "M" designates areas where data are missing, Where appropriate,
statements of user data requirements were prepared (in RTOP format) and
transmitted to NASA and these are so designated with a ME .
3, 1, 3	 Results
In this study it was found that the STS user required information
related to flight scheduling and flight manifests that was not available to
him. It was also found that data on payload dynamic loads (during ascent
and return) and load alteration approaches were not available, Recent tech-
nical studies simulating the dynamic payload/orbiter combination have
shown that dynamic loads during landing can be as high as 5 to 9 gs. These
loading conditions are critical to the design of some elements of the pay-
load structure.
The STS user has the option to use orbiter power, communica-
tions, cooling, and other services, as well as orbiter attachments, the
remote manipulator, and attitude and navigation handoff data. Each of the
services is supplied through orbiter and orbiter/payload interface equip-
ment. The user needs failure mode, effects, and frequency of occurrence
data covering each of the equipments.
During the study it was found that the acoustic environment to
which the payload would be subjected at liftoff was being predicted on the
basis of analytical studies and model testing. The uncertainty in the
predicted acoustic envirunment was relatively large and it was recommended
that a 3-sigma, worst-case type environment prediction be made for use
by payloads interested in a low-risk development program,
Statements of user data requirements were also prepared in
several additional areas. Approaches to docutr j>.nting the data required by
3-4
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STS users were developed, User document outlines are presented in the
r
Study 2. 2 Final Report, Volume II.
3. 2	 ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT STUDY
3. Z. I
	
Objective
The objective of the STS Ancillary Equipment Study was to des-
cribe, from NASA's point of view, the potential for common usage of
Multi-Mission Support Equipment (MMSE) by DoD in addition to NASA
users.
3.2.2	 Approach
The NASA Multi-Mission Support Equipment (MMSE) are described
:n the Martin Marietta catalogs for launch site and airborne (or on-line)
MMSE. The catalogs, modifications in the catalog descriptions, and
description of items not in the catalogs were furnished to this study by
MSFC and KSC.
Most of the launch site MMSE could be studied for applicability to
DoD without the detailed payload data required for the airborne MMSE.
DoD airborne ancillary equipment needs were extracted from the informa-
tion and data from the DoD STS Payload Interface Studieii.
The DoD ancillary equipment needs were then compared to the
MMSE list to identify candidate MMSE for application to the DoD mission
model. Thirty-one of the 35 items of airborne MMSE were identified as
candidates for DoD ancillary equipment,
3, 2. 3	 Results
In the near-term STS eru (through 1985), 15 on-line MMSE items
were found to have one or more potential users among the DoD payload
projects. These potentially common NASA/DoD equipments are in the
following categories:
3-5
4a,	 The I IS/payload structural interface
b.	 Mounts for piggyback payloads in the orbiter bay
C.	 Radioisotope thermoelectric generator cooling equipment
d, Orbiter/payload servicing cable (electrical)
e, Payload shroud
L	 Payload purging equipment
Thirteen launch site MMSE items were found to have potential
users in the DoD mission model.
Several equipment items were recommended for addition to the
NASA MMSE candidate list as another result of the Ancillary Equipment
Study.
3-b
4. VEHICLE COST/PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
(STUDY 2. 3)
As the space program matures, greater emphasis will be placed
on improving the ability to predict the effect of program requirements on
cost and schedules, Cost estimating techniques that give greater insight
earlier in the program cycle are required, As a step in this direction,
this study , .tas initiated to identify and quantify the interrelationships
between and within the performance, safety, cost, and schedule parameters
for unmanned, automated payload programs. These data would then be
used in support of the over-all NASA effort to generate program models
and methodology that would provide the needed insight into the effect of
changes In specific functional requirements (performance and safety) on
the total vehicle program (cost and schedule).
Previous cost modeling approaches fall into one of two basic cate-
gories; "bottom-up" or 'top-down. " The "bottom-up s ' approach, which
is tied to the development of a specific system, depends on detailed esti-
mates of tasks, material costs, manpower requirements, and schedules.
The total cost estimate is then obtained by summing the individual costs.
'Top-down' models use CER (cost estimating relationship)
approaches to estimate the cost of a specific system. In these models, the
CERs are related to distinct parameters such as weight, (see Figure 4-1).
The deficiency of the CERs lies in the fact that, altrough they identify cost
drivers, they do not model why and how the costs are driven by the para-
meters.
Since CERs have not been completely successful in meeting the
prime criterion of determining sensitivity of cost to changes in the program
requirements, top-down approaches were judged unacceptable for a cost/
4-1
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performance model. Hence, it was thought that a model oriented from the
bottom-up could lead to fulfillment of this criterion. The bottom-up
approach would allow the cost estimates to be based directly on technical
performance (see Figure 4-I) and design complexity.
	
4.1
	
GENERAL
The general concept of the Systems Cost/ Performance Model is
illustrated in Figure 4-2. The user of the Cost/Performance Model must
supply certain program data that would normally include the payload per-
formance requirements as well as general information necessary to select
a payload design. The technical portion of the model consists of a two-
step process: the first step is to select subsystem configurations that are
acceptable to the user, and the second step is to select equipment from a
database to 'mechanize the subsystem configuration. The reliability portion
of the model adds redundancy to the design so that the reliability require-
ments are met. The resulting output of the technical model is a number of
payload designs that meet or exceed the input requirements. The accept-
able designs are specified down to the subsystem component (assembly)
level. The cost and schedule required to design, build, and operate each
payload are estimated by summing up the individual cost and schedule allo-
cations based on each end item assembly specified as part of the particular
design.
	
4.2	 SIGNIFICANT RESULT
The major accomplishment of the effort was the development of a
model possessing the ability to design unmanned, automated payloads.
Subsystem, safety, cost, and schedule models were developed. Each of
these models interfaced properly with the remainder of the model. The
model was self-sufficient in that no intermediate steps needed to be per-
formed by the user. The Systems Cost/ Performance Model has been
4-3
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implemented as a digital computer program and is operational on The
Aerospace Corporation's CDC 7600 and IBM 370-155 computers and on
MSFVs Univac 1,:08 computer.
Three test cases were used to check the Cost / Performance Model
and the operation of the computer program. The three test cases were:
a. Defense Satellite Communication System (DSC. :S-II)
b. Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS-A)
C.
	
Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO-I)
The results of these three test cases indicated that the current Model was
capable of estimating spacecraft program costs with reasonable accuracy.
The error in the total cost estimate (using pro!%ainary CERs) was less
than 24%,
 relative to the actual DSCS -II costs,
Generally speaking, the Cost / Performance Model should exceed
the performance of "top-down" models. The model uses a "bottom-up"
approach and, therefore, designs the payload at the assembly level.
Greater accuracy is achieved by the very nature of the more detailed
design. This accuracy will be reflected in the cost and schedule model
estimates. A second attribute of the Cost /Performance Model is the
completeness of the design specified. Pieces of equipment are not for-
gotten, and redundancy is automatically included in the specified design.
In addition, the impact of all subsystem interfaces and interactions is
properly modeled. The net result is a payload design that is as accurate
and complete as one from a Pre -Phase A study and which is available to
the Cost /
 Performance Computer Program user immediately.
Because of the detailed nature of the model, the uses of the
System Cost / Performance Model exceed that for "top -down" models.
The following uses of the model were suggested,
4-5
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a. Pre-Phase A Planning
1.	 Structure realistic programs in terms of matching
performance, budgets, and schedule.
2 1	Perform mission model analyses.
3,	 Assess the potential savings from use of standardized
equipment.
b. Preliminary Design
1.	 Establish specific payload designs and the related
costs,
2,	 Develop standardized designs using a data base con-
sisting of standardized equipment.
3. Identify low cost designs using a data base consisting
of off-the-shelf equipment.
4. Perform modularity studies by modifying the model
to assign equipment to modules.
C,	 Program Management
1. Assess contractor cost and schedule estimates.
2. Determine the sensitivity of design, costs, and
schedules to changes in requirements.
3. Perform trade studies to identify optimal designs.
The model ca readily be expanded in its scope to perform many other
studies as well. The model will become a more: tersatile tool in terms of
preliminary program planning and in actual program management as it be-
conies more fully developed.
-1. 3	 SUGGESTED RESEARCH AND ADDITIONAL. EFFORT
It was recommended that the model be thoroughly verified and vali-
dated, The most useful validation procedure would be to use the model on
test cases selected from historical programs, operational programs, and
new starts. Historical and current programs provide the most accurate
.Iata with which to validate the model. New start programs will test the
4-6
1applicability of the model as a preliminary planning tool. It was further
recommended that the capability of the model to predict space vehicle
interrelationships be tested and that the potential of the model to assist in
programmatic change control such as configuration management be evalu-
ated by a user review.
It should be clear the additional cost, schedule, and technical data
must be collected and processed. The focus of the current study was nn
developing a model rather than augmenting a data base, Only after tale
model was successfully developed and proven as a useful tool could data
collection be justified at such a detailed level. On the other hand, lack of
adequate data hindered the development of the current model, The cost
model must be considered preliminary, and the schedule model cannot be
considered operational until sufficient data have been collected to improve
and validate the model. Hence, widespread use of the Systems Coed
Performance Model depends entirely on the collection of performance,
safety, cost, and schedule data at the subsystem component (assembly)
level,
4-7
I5. STANDARDIZATION AND PROGRAM EFFECT ANALYSIS
(STUDY 2.4)
Many current satellites in development that emplo y expendable
boosters are emphasizing the use of flight -qualified and standardized com-
ponents. Moreover, the use of standardization becomes more practical
when the satellites are designed for the STS era, since the transportation
interface will be common and the environment will be the same for each
satellite mission. A study was conducted to quantify the benefit of using
developed hardware if a large number of flight-qualified components and
standa:;d equipments are available for new starts. In addition to the study
of reducing h:,rdware costs, an analysis to examine the program practices
to control costs was also conducted. A spacecraft project that incorpo-
rated the design-to-cost philosophy was examined for this study on program
practices.
	
5. 1	 OBJECTIVE
The overall study objective was to assist NASA in the develop-
ment of potential cost savings for the satellite programs starting in 1976
and beyond. The primary tasks were: (1) catalog a large number of compo-
nents from current NASA and DoD satellites, and (2) quantity the new start
savings if the components listed in the catalog and the NASA Standard Equip-
ment are used. The secondary taskwas to review the program practices
used in a spacecraft project tNtt actually used design-to-cost philosophy,
	
5,2
	 APPROACH
The cataloging task compiled the programmatic information, key
technical characterimtics, and cost data on available flight-qualified compo-
nents from 17 current DoD and NASA satellites. Over 400 components
were cataloged with the type of information to make candidate selections on
5-1
functional and cost basis.
The new start task applied the catalog to five new starts that are
shown in figure 5-1. The spacecraft and subsystem ch.racteristics of
the new starts were developed by inputting the mission and system charac-
teristics into a computer model known as the Spacecraft Design and Cost
Model (SDCM) originally deveinped under NASA funding by Aerospace in
Study L. 3 during the period of rY 73 to rY 75, and then extended with com-
pany funds. The subsystem specialists used the SDCM output to develop
the component functional req • i rements that formed the technical bass for
component selection. The set of candidate components was there inputted
into the cost portion of the SDCM for the cost estimates. This technique
which computes spacecraft costs by component generates data to cost
evaluate alternate configurations where only components are varied.
The design-to-cost task examined the program practices of the
Earth Limb Measurements Spacecraft project. The data on program
practices were obtained by discussions with key Si.MSO, Aerospace and
Grumman project personnel, and reviewing contractual and system per-
formance reports. Practices and areas that reduced and increased costs
were identified.
5, 3	 CONCLUSIONS
The study has determined that significant program savings can be
achieved by using flight-qualified hardware, New start spacecraft can be
configured with major portions of the housekeeping subsystems using
developed components from DuD and NPSA projects, Along with the use of
components, the amount of component modifications for integrating the
unit into new starts was found to be relatively low.
The total cost reduction by extensive use of flight-qualified com-
ponents was estimated to be in excess of $100 M over the "business-as-
5-2
S ^
\d»&
$C)
3»CLtA X
2
$G&
CL$CL
^
\\
/\
@ 7§
ƒ3 ^^
^# 0
$"K
\ 2	 R /
ƒ
\	 0q
t \ /
\ /^ &\
6 ^M
.' k § k
'awl0, 2 k#
^x
^^ f
k 165
^ q - At ^ f
k \^ &
^
N
m
c
<
-
^
^
/
^
^2
<
V)
<
Z
.1
§
r
S-3
usual' approach for four new starts. Most of the savings (76 0/'o) resulted
from the reduction of component DDT&E costs. The unit spacecraft costs
were also reduced, which represented 26% of the total savings.
The Equipment Compendium (catalog) provided up to 61% of the
flight-qualified components. Of the selected components, 35% were DOD
and 26% were NASA developed units. An additional 8%n of the components
were selected from other programs that were not cataloged. The NASA
Standard Equipment represented only 3 oJo which was understandably low
because the study first searched the catalog for developed units before
selecting a NASA standard. A higher percentage of NASA Standard Equip-
ment could have been selected if the goal was to maximize the use of
standard equipments. The balance of 28% to complete the housekeeping
subsystems was new development hardware,
In addition to the extensive use of developed components, the
study indicated that the modifications were relatively low. Over 70%u of
the flight-qualified components can be integrated with less than 10%
development and 30 0/a will require over 10% development.
The cost savings summarized in Table 5-1 is based on one flight
unit and without mission equipment cost. The baseline cost savings is the
difference between business-as-usual and extensive use of developed
components, The alternate configuration represents a variant design by
selecting other components. The total savings are for four new starts.
The fifth new start studied was not included in the cost analysis since the
spacecraft is a DoD spacecraft except for reconfiguring the communication
for the NASA net.
The findings of the secondary task were that, design-to-cost
should be limited to programs where development is accomplished and the
interfaces can be clearly defined at the start of contract. The design-to-
r
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Table 5-1 . Summary of Cost Savings
DDT& E Unit Total
New
Savings I Percent Savings Percent Savings PercentStarts
$h1 Savings $M
19. (,
Savings $m Savings
l ,S'1'
Baseline 45.6 ;2 30 65. 2 31
Alternate 50. 9 16 29.	 '- 44 80. 1 39
IICIVIM
Baseline 14.	 1 33 1.	 1 10 15.2 2(?
Alternate 14. 6 35 1..'- 1	 1 1 ;. K 30
SAGE
Baseline 6.0 .'9 ' f' 7. 3 21
Alternate 7.7 33
0.
0. b 5 S. 3 24
SMM
Baseline 17, 3 25 4.6 21 21. 9 24
Alternate 20. 1 L9
30
4.8 2
17
''.4. 9 27
Baseline 113.6 26.0 109.6 21
Alternate 93. 3 33 35. 8 21 129.	 1 30
N,
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cost philosophy is most applicable to the production phase when practical
cost trades can be made. The technical problems that may be encountered
in an advanced spacecraft are difficult to quantify and control during the
DDT&E phase,
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6. STUDY OF THE COMMONALITY OF SPACE VEHICLE
APPLICATIONS TO FUTURE NATIONAL NEEDS
(STUDY 2. 5)
The study identified over 100 new and highly capable space systems
for the L980-2000 time period, designed to enable large numbers of ordi-
nary citizens to personally benefit from space in their everyday lives, as
well as to provide unprecedented kinds and levels of service to industry,
government, science, and a variety of military strategic and tactical opera-
tions. The system needs for space transportation, orbit support, and tech-
nology were derived, and those likely to be shared between NASA and the DoD
in the time period identified.
The high leverage space technologies for the time period of interest
were identified as very large antennas and optics, high power/energy,
lasers, microelectronic data processors and sensing devices, and cyro-
genic refrigerators. Guiding principles for application of this technology
were presented, including emphasis on deliberately making satellites large,
complex, and highly capable, which in turn will allow the user equipment to
be tiny, cheap, and portable; allowing its proliferation to millions of users
and providing services not otherwise possible, while simultaneously mini-
mizing the total of satellite and user equipment cost. Other principles
identified include the use of large but simple reflector satellites in low
altitude orbit for multinational systems; extensive use of orbital assembly,
servicing, resupply, and reuse; and an identification of the primary roles
of man as assembly, test, initialization, servicing, modification, retire-
ment, and reuse functions in the support of large complex satellites ( in
addition to research and exploration).
A new concept in self-adjusting phased arrays consisting of inde-	 ti
6-1
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pendent coarsely stationkept sub-units, with adaptive phase control to
achieve performance equivalent to that single-structure antenna without
the structural rigidity and weight was conceived during the course of the
study, 'The concept would allow antennas and optics of essentially un-
limited size to be constructed in space, without the usual weight and
alignment constraints, and would enhance the feasibility of the large, com-
plex satellites called for in the study,
Over 40 civilian and 60 military space system concept "Initia-
tives" were identified representing a catalog of space opportunities for
personal, civic, industrial, government, international, scientific, and
military applications. Many of these initiative concepts were conceived
during this study, and most depend on bold forecasts of the likely advance
of technology in the high leverage areas identified above. The results of
first-order calculations on size, weight, cost, and performance of each
initiative were documented, as were their needs for transportation,
orbital support, and technology.
A set of Q program plans for civilian and military activities was
derived using six alternate world situation scenarios identified in the
study, spanning the range from war to peace in i,e international environ-
ment, and a corresponding range of internal domestic environments, The
supporting needs of each of these program plans for low earth orbit trans-
portation, orbital transfer transportation, orbital assembly and servicing
vehicles, orbital support facilities, and required technology were then
derived,
The supporting needs of the group of initiative concepts taken as
a whole were derived, in which it was shown that the majority of systems
require only the Space Shuttle; orbital transfer vehicles such as the interim
and full capability tugs and a solar-electric propulsion stage; automated or
NI
6-z
manual orbital assembly and servicing stages; and orbital suppor facili-
ties such as orbital assembly yards, warehouses,, and research and test
stations.
It was then shown that for all non-catastrophic world futures con-
sidered, most of the potential missions for the NASA and DoD in the time
period :,hare the above requirements, such that single development
programs could be expected to yield dual use supporting hardwar i.
The study also concluded that the great range of civilian capa-
bilities represented by all the system concepts identified, including the
100 initiatives and all the programs in the 1973 NASA Mission Model, could
be acquired with an average space budget of less than five billion a year,
provided that the peaks in funding can be properly phased or that some
arrangement can be made to amortize the peaks.
A presentation summarizing the results of the study was briefed
to most NASA Centers and Offices, the Administrator, the staff and some
members of the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Application, the
National Space Institute, and many others, including numerous military
personnel. The messages have the potential of favorably impacting the
way the public sees the National space program, and a vigorous public
relations activity is recommended,
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7. STS SPIN STABILIZED UPPER STAGE (SSUS) STUDY
(STUDY 2.6)
The SSUS Study investigated the utility of spinning solid upper
stages deployed from the Orbiter to perform a variety of upper stage
NASA payload missions. The general concept of the SSUS is illustrated
in Figure 7-1. The nominal geosynchronous mission began with Orbiter
injection into a 296 km (160 nmi) parking orbit. The SSUS was elevated
on the cradle/spin table in the Orbiter cargo bay, spin stabilized and
separated. After separation to a safe distance the SSUS perigee motor
was fired, injecting the spacecraft into a geosynchronous transfer orbit.
The spacecraft was tracked by ground stations while in the transfer orbit
and the spacecraft apogee motor fired to circularize the orbit at 35.786
km (19.323 nmi).
The SSUS was found to be more attractive for Delta class pay-
loads (up to 1000 lb on orbit) and Atlas Centaur class payloads (up to 2100
lbs on orbit). The Delta class missions appeared particularly attractive
due to the multiple payload possiblities. The SSUS was found to be most
applicable to spin stabilized payloads and 3-axis stabilized payloads
designed for spinning transfer missions, such as, RCA Satcom andFleet-
satcom. Large TIIIC, TIIIE/Centaur class payloads and complex 3-axis
stabilized satellites such as the EO-09A Synchronous Earth Observation
Satellite (featuring a 1. 5 meter telescope sensor) could be flown with a
SSUS system, but the satellite modifications were extensive and the SS1TS
system became essentially as large as an IUS.
The Task 2. 6 study involved four subtasks; Subtask I was the
NASA Geosynchronous Payload Model Development. NASA non-communica-
tion/navigation payloads were studied for SSUS deployment. SSPDA Tug
7-1
3^d
t
Or--p4
-^ — a oc
r k^ a WQ Ly. W W Qa.Onmo a aW L
v ► 	 ac
a' d cr
m Z ma a crO v► O
cr
i
Q
C
^::)per
M U Z)
CIO
cr
► - X
.^ v+ a
A
C
O
H 0
v ^
V
V) 01
;^ u
t^
7
W
Q
CL
Q {
LAJ Y
V1 a
0W adW
orO
O
z
Y l
v O
W d
W
4
a
CL W
Q V1
p-
m
tY
O
V2
N
Qx
wW O W
a w
Q ^ 4
O ►^
^- t= L
V) v
W ZU
Q m ►^
0
L
YQ W
r	 u.. of
040:
4 d cr
2 — 1- —
Y 1 wi v a o
of t
L O.]c Q
Cl p QF
_) ZD ^-a000--ocxcG
oc.^^aa
7-Z
i
s
^ '1
design payloads were studied for the impact of SSLIS. Spin stabilized
satellites were found to be readily adaptable to SSUS. It was feasible to
spin the 3-axis satellites for the SSUS deployment and to despin after
;apogee Injection for normal 3-axis stabilized orbital operations. The
satellite, and SSL fS combinations studied were unstable due to the low spin
inertia to transverse inertia ratio through final injection so that an active
nutation control was required. Partial power up from the folded solar
revolutions prior to final injection to supply power for the active satellite/
5S11S systems,
The 3-axis stabilized satellites required addition of sun and earth
sensors, active notation, some TT&C components and ACS propellants
fo	 i.tatiun control, precession maneuvers, and injection error correc-
tit,. Cost estimates of the satellite SSUS impacts were prepared using
the FY 1974 NASW-2575 Study 2.3 System Cost/Performance Analyses,
modified to use component data supplied by satellite subsystem specialists,
The SSLIS estimated cost impacts to spin stabilized satellites were negli-
gible and, in fact, with small redesign the progenitor SMS/GOES satel-
lites of today are compatible with the SSUS. The estimated cost impact to
the larger 3-axis spacecraft ranged from $2 to $6M in the development
costs and $0. 5 to $1. 5M in the unit costs.
Subtask II involved several SSUS study areas; geosynchronous
mission sizing studies, accuracy, conceptual stage/cradle design, and
SSLIS system cost estimation, The Subtask 11 sizing studies were combined
with Subtask III which is primarily a review of the total NASA 1951-1991
Mission Model for SSUS capture and recommendations on resizing, The
sizing studies indicated that the entire geosynchronous mission model
could be accomplished with two new solid rocket motors having about 1800
kg (4000 lb) and 6000 kg (13, 250 lb) of propellant at their design points,
7-3
off-loaded versions of these motors, and existing TE-M-364 series and
'I'k:-M-616 motors (as shown in 'fable 7-1). These sizing studies were
conducted on an optimum velocity propellant off-load basis for geosyn-
ehr noun and earth orbit missions so as to provide minimum orbital error;,,
Energy management techniques with non . ptimum velocity vectors and
pitch yaw angles introduce larger Injection errors, but would reduce the
number of solid rocket motor propellant loadings required, The planetary
mission designs did not resolve issues of injection accuracy and orbit
correction which were established to be solvable problems for earth orbit
missions,
The injection accuracy studies utilized the Orbiter initial naviga-
tion position and capability t, , establish a state vector using an accurate
payload mounted (spin table in the case of SSUS) auxiliary sensor (star
sensor selected) as stipulated in JSC07700 Volume XN. Other SSt1S error
sources and their magnitude were assessed in several areas of study.
These studies included tip-off errors, attitude sensing and command errors,
and dynamic errors. The overall evaluation of these errors showed the
SSUS to be equal to the present day Delta 2914 expendable launch vehicle
accuracy into the geosynchronous transfer orbit, Utilizirg the same tech-
niques of ground station tracking and command of the satellite in practice
for today's Delta payloads, near-perfect final orbits are achievable by
carrying about: 45 meters, per second (150 ft per Second) of ACS propellant
equivalent in the satellite. These errors are considerably greater than
tite estimated errors for the Tug and IUS and exceed the SSPDA satellite
injection accuracy requirements (as shown in Table 7-2),
The conceptual design studies of the SSUS examined several ideas
oil SSUS deployment from the Orbiter, but settled on the Orbiter Bay cradle
mounted spin table as the baseline concept most representative of the
SSUS system type. The spin table provided the mc , t direct deployment
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i	 M	 ^
mechanism approach in utilizing the Orbiter navigation and pointing capa-
bility, appeared to have the fewest unresolved error sources in tipoff and
spin up, and could be assessed within the study limitations. Solid roa.cet
motor and structural shell design was conventional with explosive bolt and
captive spring separation systems similar to present ELV practice. The
spin table designs featured D. C. torque motor drives through a V-belt
system and a short stiff shaft mounted in angular contact ball bearings,
A ^:onical spin table extension interfaced with the SSUS aft skirt. The spin
table carried no launch loads as these were taken up by conventional IUS
cradle style trunions. The spin table was rotated and erected by a ball
screw jack system with electric motor drive. Safety analyses suggested
electric motor dynamic braking and a mechanical brake to despin the plat-
form in case of abort as well as after normal SSUS separation. Failure to
retract the spin table can be resolved through a design that clears the
Orbiter Bay doors and/or is jettisonable with explosive bolts and RMS
disposal.
The designs and operating concepts were analyzed for RDT&E
and unit costs, utilizing the SAMSO IUS assessment cost data bank. The
IUS data bank exists in very great detail and presented some problems in
interpretation due to the contrasting lack of detail in the SSUS concepts.
Table 7-3 summarizes these cost estimates. The Delta Class Perigee
Stage Only $34. 1M RDT&E breaks down as follows: $6.3M Stage develop-
ment, $10. 5M Cradle/Spin Table Development, $7. 6M System Engineering
and Management, $6. 4 other costs, and $3, 311 for Facilities. An Atlas
Centaur Class Perigee Stage System added another $27. 1M total above the
Delta Class costs.
Subtask IV required an operations analysis of the IBM and Martin
Marietta Corp, IUS/Tug studies in contrast with conceptual SSUS opera-
tions, SSUS basic operations concepts of a system that is satellite-
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dependent and commanded by a satellite operations control center ground
net system differ sharply from the relatively autonomous IUS/Tug con-
cepts. Ground operations are characterized by simplicity and a single
major SSUS spin balance, alignment, and assembly facility at the launch
site. The spin facility dynamically balances the individual motors and
satellites, performs a precise CG alignment and assembly/ checkout for
each SSUS stack, and installs the SSUS in the deployment cradle and/or
spin table. From this facility, it would be transported like any other
upper stage. The SSUS considered as an addition to the IUS or Tug has no
significant impact on the IBM IUS/Tug Orbital Operations and Mission
Support Study. The SSUS impacts are primarily in the Orbiter Interface
and Flight Operations, the Ground Tracking Network, and the Spacecraft
Operations Control Center.
Major SSUS study conclusions were:
a. The SSUS is a technically feasible method of injecting
satellites into earth orbits with the STS.
b. New satellites whether 3-axis or spin stabilized can be
economically designed for spinning transfers.
C. Present Delta and Atlas Centaur geosynchronous mission
satellites all have spinning transfer capability and can be
flown on SSUS.
d. Injection accuracy of the SSUS is equivalent to present
Delta accuracy and inferior tc Atlas/Centaur, Titan IIIC,
and IUS accuracy.
e. Planetary missions involving spin stabilization of multiple
solid rocket motors require further study for mission design,
accuracy, and stability.
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B. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST
(STUDY 2, 7)
The purpose of this study was to provide to NASA technological
and planning insight based on The Aerospace Corporation's familiarity
with DoD space technology and programs, and in-house technology innova-
tions. The scope of this study included an assessment and forecast of
passive and active sensing space technology based on understanding and
review of relevant developments by the DoD, and assembly of a catalog of
high-leverage unexplored technological opportunities. The time frame
considered was through the year 2000, with a nearer cutoff date applic-
able for forecasts in which visibility so far into the future was not possible.
8. 1	 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST
In this task, The Aerospace Corporation has assessed the current
state-of-the-art in passive and active remote sensing from space, with
application to sensing of terrestrial, airborne, and spaceborne man-made
and natural objects. A preliminary forecast has been prepared for the
optical and microwave technologies, Areas emphasized were those where
limited information was available in the general literature, and where
SAMSO experience and estimates did not clearly coincide with NASA's.
The forecast assumed nominal DoD emphasis similar to that experienced
in the recent past and current environment.
Generally speaking, most technology areas are expected to pro-
gress in an evolutionary fashion and to be able to support the projected
DoD systems at the appropriate times. The technology advancements
considered included the following:
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a, Optical Sensing
1. Infrared sensors
2. Visible sensors
3. Multispectral scanners
b. Microwave Radiometry
1, Antennas
2. High power transmitters
3. Low noise receivers
The forecast included descriptions of the characteristics and per-
formance of components and potential systems. Although mission life or
mean mission duration is a prime consideration in all SAMSO spaceborne
equipment, no effort was made to quantify reliability here because the inter-
dependence among parts of different space systems made it difficult to
compare experience with specific components.
The forecast included a section showing the projected trends in
performance according to year of availability. Trends were presented for
the outstanding characteristics for each technology, system, and/or compo-
nent. Specific data points taken from the system component material were
identified in order to substantiate the projected trends.
8. 2	 NEW TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES
In the preparation of a list of possible space initiatives for the
1980 - 2000 period, a significant number of technology items were identi-
fied that merit further highlighting for possible future development. The
technology items can be categorized as follows:
a. Lasers
b. Large structures
C. Observation technology
d. Quantum state engineering
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Examples of these items include an adaptive self-pointing method for
directing laser energy to a small distant target, a computer controlled
phased array transmitting or receiving antenna for synthesizing high
quality fronts from poorly postioned elements, and a very low noise level
microwave detector. All these items are of a relatively advanced char-
acter, suited for consideration in advanced planning for the 1980 - L000
period and unlikely to be currently includea in present short-term develop-
ment plans.
The items represent the following classes of items:
a. Ideas for specific devices potentially useful for advanced
space systems; for example, a Mylar-' film optical mirror
whose figure can be controlled using electrostatic forces
generated by locally sprayed charge.
b. Specific technology areas whose understanding will permit
significant advances in space systems or in applications of
current systems: for example, the technology applications
of extremely low temperatures in the millikelvin range, or
the mechanization of long life cyrogenic refrigerators with
no moving parts for detector cooling using magnetic control
of electron spin alignment in certain materials.
C. More speculative technology areas or device possibilities,
which are not easy to concretely specify at present but
which, on future exploration, may result in significant
space applications: for example, uses of plasma phenomena
to couple energy from one electromagnetic mode to another,
The Aerospace Corporation has performed the preliminary analyses
to determine whether further exploratory work is worthwhile, systematized
the description of the items, and documented the results in a brief technical
summary with an accompanying diagram for each item. Approximately ten
items have been treated in this preliminary fashion and assembled into a
catalog.
* Registered trademark
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